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The Unending Frontier: The Fragile Truce Between Kabul and Islamabad

The Mirage of Peace in Gaza's Second Act

Monday, 20 October 2025 00:35

Abstract

The recent, deadly cross-border conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, culminating in a Qatar-brokered ceasefire, underscores the enduring volatility of a relationship defined by a disputed colonial-era border and the sanctuary afforded to militant groups. The temporary halt in hostilities masks a deeper, structural crisis rooted in history and the irreconcilable demands of two states sharing a volatile, porous frontier.

Historical Context

Recent Findings

The Week of Fire and Retaliation

The most recent and deadliest outbreak of hostilities in years between Afghanistan and Pakistan began with a series of targeted aerial assaults10,7. In the early hours of 9 October 20254,11, Pakistan reportedly carried out airstrikes in several Afghan provinces, including the capital, Kabul, as well as Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika4,12. The primary target of the strike in Kabul, near Abdul Haq Square in District 84,6, was believed to be Noor Wali Mehsud4,11, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)11. While the TTP released an unverified audio recording claiming Mehsud had survived4, at least two senior TTP members were confirmed killed in the Kabul strike4. Pakistan’s military did not officially confirm or deny the strikes, instead stating it had carried out a “series of retribution operations”5.

The Afghan Taliban government’s Ministry of Defence condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty5 and launched a significant retaliatory operation5. On the night of 11 to 12 October4, Afghan forces attacked multiple Pakistani military posts along the 2,640-kilometre border5,23. The fighting was particularly intense around the Chaman-Spin Boldak crossing10,6 and the Kurram district10. The Afghan Taliban claimed their forces killed 58 Pakistani soldiers and captured 25 military posts4,5, while admitting to the loss of nine of their own fighters4,5. Pakistan’s military, however, reported that 23 of its soldiers were killed and 29 were wounded5,11, claiming in turn to have killed 200 “Taliban and affiliated terrorists” in their counter-strikes5. The claims and counter-claims of casualties were highly disputed, a common feature of the conflict9.

The humanitarian toll was severe, with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reporting on 16 October that 37 civilians were killed and 425 were wounded in Afghanistan during the first week of cross-border clashes4,7. The heaviest civilian casualties were reported on 15 October4, with victims in the provinces of Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Khost, and Helmand4,7. Local health officials in Kandahar reported that the death toll in Spin Boldak alone rose to 40 on the Afghan side, with 171 others injured4. Among the wounded in the district hospital were at least 80 women and children4. The violence also led to the closure of key trade routes, including the Torkham and Chaman crossings24, and widespread displacement as hundreds of people fled border villages on both sides10,8. The Afghan cricket board also cancelled its participation in a T20I tournament after reporting that eight people, including three players, were killed in a Pakistani strike in Paktika13.

The Doha Diplomatic Intervention

The rapid escalation of the conflict, which saw the use of heavy artillery, drone strikes, and ground raids10,22, prompted urgent diplomatic intervention from regional powers6. An initial, temporary 48-hour ceasefire was agreed upon on 15 October8,19, taking effect at 6 pm local time19. This initial truce was facilitated by diplomatic sources, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia playing a role in defusing the immediate tensions6,19. However, the truce was fragile, with both sides accusing the other of violations12,16.

Following the brief pause, high-level delegations from both nations travelled to Doha, Qatar, for more substantive negotiations13,16. The talks were mediated by Qatar and Turkey14,20, with the Afghan delegation led by Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob20 and the Pakistani side led by Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif14,20. The negotiations culminated in an agreement on 18-19 October 202520,13 for an immediate and sustained ceasefire16.

The terms of the agreement, as announced by Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, included an immediate cessation of hostilities and a mutual commitment to respect territorial sovereignty14,20. The Afghan Taliban’s spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, stated that the sides would “refrain from targeting each other’s security forces, civilians, or critical infrastructure”13. Crucially, the agreement also included a commitment from Kabul not to “support groups carrying out attacks against the government of Pakistan”13. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif confirmed that the agreement stipulated that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan onto Pakistani soil would cease immediately20.

To ensure the sustainability of the truce, the agreement established a third-party mediated mechanism to review compliance claims and verify implementation14,16. Follow-up meetings are scheduled to take place in Istanbul on 25 October14,20 to develop these verification procedures and consolidate the peace16. Despite the diplomatic success in securing a pause, the differing statements on who requested the initial ceasefire—Pakistan claiming the Taliban requested it after a “powerful response”19, and the Taliban claiming the opposite—highlighted the deep-seated mistrust that continues to plague the relationship19.

The Shadow of the Durand Line

The root cause of the perennial conflict is the 2,640-kilometre (1,640-mile) border known as the Durand Line17,23. This demarcation was established on 12 November 189318,23 through an agreement between Sir Mortimer Durand17,23, a British diplomat, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan18,23, the Emir of Afghanistan23. The line was intended to fix the limits of the respective spheres of influence between the Emirate of Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire23, serving as a buffer zone against Russian expansion during the 'Great Game'23.

The line’s enduring controversy stems from its arbitrary division of the Pashtun tribal community17. Millions of ethnic Pashtuns, who are the majority in Afghanistan, reside on both sides of the border22,17. This division fuelled the mid-20th century movement for an independent state of Pashtunistan17. When Pakistan gained independence from the British Raj in 1947, it inherited the Durand Line agreement15,23. However, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 194726, and no Afghan government since then has officially recognised the Durand Line as the legitimate international border17,22.

In 1949, a loya jirga in Afghanistan unilaterally declared the Durand Line an 'imaginary line' and voided all previous agreements regarding it23. Pakistan, and the international community, maintain that the border is legitimate under the principle of *uti possidetis juris*18, which dictates that post-colonial states should maintain the same borders as the preceding colonial power18. The legitimacy of the line was further cemented in the 1919 Anglo-Afghan Treaty15,17 and the 1988 Geneva Accords18. Despite its official stance of non-recognition, Kabul has continued to operate immigration and customs checkpoints along the line18, tacitly acknowledging its function as a de facto boundary18. The Afghan Taliban, in particular, have been highly vocal in their rejection, sometimes referring to it as 'The Hypothetical Line'22. Pakistan’s ongoing effort to fence the 1,640-mile border18 is viewed by the Taliban as an attempt to formalise a boundary they consider illegitimate, leading to frequent clashes over construction and border post maintenance27.

The TTP Nexus and the Sanctuary State

The immediate catalyst for the October 2025 violence was Pakistan’s accusation that the Afghan Taliban government is providing a safe haven for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)9,11. The TTP, often referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, is a distinct organisation from the Afghan Taliban, founded in 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud21. Its stated objective is to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish an emirate based on its interpretation of Islamic law21.

Despite being separate entities, the two groups share a common ideology, ethnic composition, and cultural background11. The TTP provided the Afghan Taliban with recruits and shelter during the latter’s fight against US and NATO forces21. When the Afghan Taliban seized power in Kabul in August 20217, the TTP’s leadership and fighters, who had been weakened by Pakistani offensives, found renewed sanctuary in the border regions of Afghanistan24. Since 2021, the TTP has significantly stepped up its attacks inside Pakistan25, with an independent conflict-monitoring group reporting hundreds of attacks in the past year13. A 2024 United Nations report estimated the total number of TTP fighters in Afghanistan to be between 6,000 and 6,50021.

Pakistan’s core grievance is that the Afghan Taliban, despite international pressure and historical ties to Islamabad, is either unwilling or unable to curb the TTP threat21. The Afghan Taliban, however, consistently denies that the TTP is tolerated or that its territory is being used to launch attacks against Pakistan9,11. Kabul’s reluctance to act decisively against the TTP is attributed to several factors21. Firstly, the TTP is a powerful ideological ally, and a military campaign against them could fracture the broader Taliban movement21. Secondly, the Afghan Taliban is also grappling with the threat posed by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP)21, and it fears pushing the TTP into an alliance with this rival group21. For Islamabad, the TTP’s resurgence represents an existential security threat24, leading to the launch of counter-insurgency operations like 'Azm-e-Istkeham' in June 202421, which focuses on both internal and cross-border insurgency21. The October 9 airstrikes, targeting the TTP leadership, were a clear signal that Pakistan is willing to violate Afghan sovereignty to eliminate the threat11.

A Cycle of Broken Pacts

The October 2025 ceasefire is merely the latest in a long history of temporary truces and failed diplomatic efforts that have punctuated the relationship since Pakistan’s creation in 194715. The border has been a site of armed skirmishes and firefights since 194915, with major phases of conflict erupting in 1949–1950, 1960–1961, and a prolonged period from 1973 to 199215. The violence has often been tied to Afghanistan’s irredentist claims over Pashtun-occupied territory17.

In the 1950s and 1960s, instability was exacerbated by Afghanistan’s alignment with the Soviet Union for arms17, following a US-Pakistan arms deal17. A particularly deadly incident occurred on 29 September 1984, when a reported Afghan Air Force aircraft flew across the Durand Line and bombed the Pakistani border town of Teri Mangal15. The bombing killed 32 people, injured 48, and destroyed 200 local shops15.

The current cycle of violence, however, is primarily driven by the TTP24. Since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021, there have been over 150 conflicts between the two sides24. Previous attempts at a lasting peace have consistently failed due to the TTP issue28. In late 2021 and 2022, Pakistan attempted to negotiate a peace deal with the TTP, using the Afghan Taliban as a mediator28. These talks led to a temporary ceasefire in November 202128, but the TTP broke the truce in December 202228, accusing Pakistan of violating the terms28. The failure of the Afghan Taliban to enforce the terms of that truce, or to disarm and relocate the TTP fighters as Pakistan demanded, demonstrated the limits of Islamabad’s leverage and the Afghan Taliban’s internal constraints28. The pattern is clear: a major TTP attack in Pakistan leads to a Pakistani military response, which is then met by an Afghan Taliban counter-attack, followed by a temporary, externally-brokered ceasefire10,6,19. Without addressing the TTP’s sanctuary and the border’s legitimacy, the cycle is destined to repeat28.

The New Great Game on the Border

The October 2025 crisis unfolded against a backdrop of shifting regional power dynamics, suggesting that the border conflict is now intertwined with a new 'Great Game' for influence in Afghanistan24. The timing of the clashes coincided with a significant diplomatic move by India, which announced plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul25,24. This decision followed a visit by the Afghan Taliban’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to India6,25, the first such high-level engagement since the Taliban takeover in 20216.

For Pakistan, the growing India-Afghanistan cooperation is a source of deep concern6, as Islamabad has historically viewed Afghanistan through the lens of 'strategic depth' against India24. Pakistan has accused India of stoking tensions and using the TTP as a proxy25,19, allegations that New Delhi denies25. India’s primary motivation is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a hub for militancy that threatens its own security25, and it views the Afghan Taliban as a 'lesser evil' compared to groups like IS-KP25. The Afghan Taliban, in turn, seeks economic assistance from India to offset the decline in Western donor support since 202125.

China also has a vested interest in the stability of the border region29. Beijing is concerned about the security of its Belt and Road Initiative projects, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)29, which runs through Pakistan. The TTP and other militant groups pose a direct threat to Chinese workers and investments29. China has repeatedly urged the Afghan Taliban to take decisive action against all militant groups29, adding another layer of external pressure on Kabul.

This complex geopolitical environment has diminished Pakistan’s leverage over the Afghan Taliban19. Islamabad was once the Taliban’s principal external supporter19, but the current Afghan administration is now seeking to diversify its diplomatic and economic relationships with regional players like India, Russia, and Iran25,29. The border clashes, therefore, are not just a security issue but a manifestation of Pakistan’s struggle to maintain its influence in a post-2021 Afghanistan that is increasingly asserting its own strategic autonomy24.

Conclusion

The ceasefire brokered in Doha provides a necessary, if temporary, respite from the deadliest cross-border fighting in years7,10. The agreement’s success in establishing verification mechanisms and securing a commitment to respect sovereignty offers a narrow path toward de-escalation14,20. However, the underlying structural causes of the conflict remain fundamentally unresolved11. The twin issues of the TTP’s sanctuary and the non-recognition of the Durand Line are deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing17,24. As long as the Afghan Taliban views the TTP as an ideological ally and refuses to formally accept the colonial-era border22,21, Pakistan will continue to face an existential security threat that it is willing to address through unilateral military action11. The cycle of TTP attacks, Pakistani retaliation, Afghan counter-attack, and externally-brokered truce will persist until a political solution addresses the core dispute over the frontier and the issue of militant safe havens28. The current peace is not a resolution, but merely a pause in a chronic conflict that defines the security landscape of South Asia9.

References

  1. 2025 Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict - Wikipedia

    Supports details on the start date (9 October 2025), the target of the Pakistani airstrike (Noor Wali Mehsud), the TTP casualties, the Afghan Taliban's counter-attack claims (58 Pakistani soldiers killed, 9 Afghan fighters killed), and the UNAMA civilian casualty figures (37 killed, 425 wounded) and locations (Spin Boldak, Kabul, Khost, Paktika).

  2. Heavy clashes erupt along Pakistan-Afghanistan border - The Guardian

    Supports the Afghan Taliban's accusation of Pakistan violating sovereignty, the retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military posts, Pakistan's reported military casualties (23 killed, 29 wounded), and the claim of killing 200 'Taliban and affiliated terrorists'.

  3. Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Conflict - MitKat Advisory Services Pvt Ltd

    Supports the date of the Pakistani aerial assault on Kabul (09 October), the location of intense clashes (Spin Boldak and Chaman), the initial 48-hour ceasefire date (15 October), the mediation role of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the context of the Afghan Foreign Minister's visit to India.

  4. Taliban government blames Pakistan for drone strikes on Afghanistan | PBS News

    Supports the description of the clashes as the deadliest since 2021, the UNAMA civilian casualty figures (37 killed, 425 wounded), and the provinces affected (Paktya, Paktika, Kunar, Khost, Kandahar, and Helmand).

  5. Afghanistan, Pakistan - Border conflict (DG ECHO, DG ECHO Partners, media) (ECHO Daily Flash of 16 October 2025) - ReliefWeb

    Supports the agreement of a 48-hour ceasefire between Pakistan and the de facto authorities (DfA) in Afghanistan, effective from 18:00 hours on 15 October, and the civilian evacuation orders.

  6. A Layered Analysis of the 2025 Afghanistan-Pakistan Crisis: History, Internal Politics, and the Return of Great Power Competition - MEPEI

    Supports the general context of the October 2025 fighting, the disputed casualty figures, Pakistan's accusation of Afghanistan harbouring TTP, and the Afghan Taliban's denial.

  7. Dozens killed in fresh clashes along Afghanistan-Pakistan border - The Guardian

    Supports the description of the violence as the deadliest cross-border clashes in years, the locations of the fighting (Kurram district, Chaman, Spin Boldak), the use of heavy shelling, and the immediate declaration of a ceasefire by Wednesday night.

  8. Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict (2025) | Border, Relations, & Causes - Britannica

    Supports the trigger event (Pakistan's air strike on 9 October 2025 targeting TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud), the TTP's nature as a discrete group from the Afghan Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban's denial of TTP tolerance.

  9. Pakistan–Afghanistan Border Clashes Escalate: 10 Dead as Kabul Claims Pakistan Violated Ceasefire with Airstrike - The Logical Indian

    Supports the claim that Pakistan broke a fragile 48-hour ceasefire by launching airstrikes on Paktika province.

  10. Kabul, Islamabad Agree To Verification Talks as Ceasefire Takes Hold - The Media Line

    Supports the final truce being brokered by Qatar and Turkey, the Afghan Taliban's commitment not to 'support groups carrying out attacks against the government of Pakistan,' the high-level Afghan delegation led by the defense minister, and the report of three cricket players killed in a Pakistani strike.

  11. Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to ceasefire in Doha talks - Yeni Safak English

    Supports the mediation role of Qatar and Türkiye, the commitment to respect territorial sovereignty, the establishment of verification mechanisms, and the scheduling of follow-up talks in Istanbul.

  12. Afghanistan–Pakistan border skirmishes - Wikipedia

    Supports the history of the Durand Line being reaffirmed in 1919, Pakistan inheriting the agreement in 1947, the history of armed skirmishes since 1949, the major phases of conflict (1949–1950, 1960–1961, 1973–1992), and the 1984 bombing of Teri Mangal.

  13. Pakistan, Afghanistan agree to 'immediate ceasefire' says Qatar after fresh strikes | Top points | World News - Hindustan Times

    Supports the final truce being brokered by Qatar and Turkey, the agreement for an 'immediate ceasefire,' and the commitment to hold follow-up meetings to ensure sustainability and verification.

  14. The complex history of the Durand Line that divides Pakistan and Afghanistan - The Indian Express

    Supports the length of the Durand Line (2,640-kilometre), the date of the 1893 negotiation by Sir Mortimer Durand, the division of the Pashtun community, the Pashtunistan movement, Afghanistan's non-recognition of the line, and the history of Afghanistan turning to the Soviet Union for arms in 1953.

  15. The Durand Line: A Legal Perspective and Way Forward - ISSRA - Insight

    Supports the date of the Durand Line agreement (12 November 1893), the signatories (Sir Mortimer Durand and Abdur Rahman Khan), the principle of 'uti possidetis juris,' the 1988 Geneva Accords, and the fact that Kabul operates immigration and customs checkpoints.

  16. Ceasefire declared after Pakistan hits targets in Kabul, Kandahar - Dawn

    Supports the details of the 48-hour ceasefire (6 pm local time, 48-hour duration), the differing claims on who requested the ceasefire, the mediation role of Qatar, and the observation that the ceasefire highlights Pakistan's diminishing leverage over Kabul.

  17. Pakistan-Afghanistan ceasefire agreed after Qatar, Turkiye's mediation: Defence Minister Khawaja Asif confirms agreement, says two sides will meet again in Istanbul on October 25. - The News International

    Supports the final ceasefire agreement date (18-19 October 2025), the mediation by Qatar and Turkiye, the leaders of the delegations (Khawaja Asif and Mullah Yaqoob), the commitment that terrorism from Afghanistan will stop immediately, and the follow-up meeting date in Istanbul (October 25).

  18. The Resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban – Implications for Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations - PRIF

    Supports the TTP's formation (2007 by Baitullah Mehsud), its objective (overthrow Pakistani government), the TTP's estimated strength in Afghanistan (6,000-6,500 fighters), the TTP's ideological link to the Afghan Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban's fear of pushing the TTP into an alliance with IS-KP.

  19. Durand Line is now Pak's most dangerous front - The Sunday Guardian

    Supports the Afghan Taliban referring to the Durand Line as 'The Hypothetical Line' and the fact that millions of Afghan Pashtuns live east of the line.

  20. Durand Line - Wikipedia

    Supports the length of the Durand Line (2,640-kilometre), the date of establishment (12 November 1893), the signatories (Mortimer Durand and Abdur Rahman Khan), the purpose (buffer zone/Great Game), the 1949 loya jirga declaration, and the fact that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the UN in 1947.

  21. The Return of the Great Game: India and Pakistan's Shadow War in Afghanistan - International Affairs

    Supports the TTP re-establishing itself in borderlands, Pakistan viewing the TTP as an existential threat, the closure of Torkham and Chaman crossings, the description of the conflict as a 'shadow war' and 'New Great Game,' and the number of conflicts since 2021 (over 150).

  22. India is seeking to reset relations with the Taliban. But can this rapprochement last? - Chatham House

    Supports the timing of the India-Afghanistan rapprochement coinciding with the border clashes, the TTP stepping up attacks since 2021, India's plan to reopen its embassy in Kabul, the visit by Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India, and India's motivation to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a militancy hub.

  23. Afghanistan–Pakistan relations - Wikipedia

    Supports the fact that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1947.

  24. Pakistan-Afghanistan border fence: The barrier that is dividing a nation - BBC News

    Supports the fact that Pakistan's fencing of the 1,640-mile border is a source of conflict and is viewed by the Taliban as an attempt to formalise an illegitimate boundary.

  25. The TTP’s Resurgence and the Future of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations - United States Institute of Peace

    Supports the history of the failed 2021-2022 peace talks between Pakistan and the TTP mediated by the Afghan Taliban, the TTP breaking the truce in December 2022, and the failure of the Afghan Taliban to disarm or relocate TTP fighters.

  26. China’s Role in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict - The Diplomat

    Supports China's interest in the stability of the border region, its concern over the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and its pressure on the Afghan Taliban to act against militant groups.